Rubber stamps and blank cheques: restoring the balance of power before 2027

By Nkanu Egbe · November 2026

With 64 days to the presidential and National Assembly polls and 85 to the governorship and state assembly elections, Nigerians are arguing about the top of the ticket. The more urgent question sits further down the ballot: who will check the people we elect?

Every four years, Nigerians argue fiercely about who becomes president and governor. Then most of us hand the legislative ballot to the party logo. That habit has become expensive.

INEC has fixed 16 January 2027 for the presidential and National Assembly elections, and 6 February 2027 for the governorship and state Houses of Assembly elections. The dates were brought forward from February and March after the Electoral Act 2026 redrew the calendar. On those two Saturdays, voters will fill 469 federal seats and nearly 1,000 state assembly seats.

The charge against the legislatures elected in 2023 is familiar. They are accused of being rubber stamps. Budgets, loans and emergency proclamations pass with little debate. Oversight, critics say, has given way to a share of the spoils. This examiner tests that charge against the record, hears the defence, and sets out what voters and reformers can do, before the polls and after them.

What the Constitution intended

The 1999 Constitution does not ask the legislature to agree with the executive. It asks it to stand apart from it.

• Separate powers. Sections 4 and 5 vest lawmaking in the legislature and execution in the president and governors. Neither is meant to borrow the other’s authority.
• The power of the purse. Under sections 80 to 83, no money leaves the Consolidated Revenue Fund except as the National Assembly authorises. The state equivalents bind governors the same way.
• The power to investigate. Sections 88 and 89 let the legislature probe any ministry or agency, and summon anyone to explain how public money was spent.
• Special majorities for grave decisions. Section 305(6)(b) requires two-thirds of all members of each chamber to approve a state of emergency. Section 9 sets similar thresholds for changing the Constitution.
• Money of their own. Section 121(3) says funds due to a state House of Assembly and the state judiciary are paid directly to them, not released at a governor’s pleasure.

On paper, the design is sound. The question is what has been made of it.

How we got here: from 1999 to 2026

The decline was gradual. The legislature has been strongest when its presiding officers owed their seats to their colleagues, and weakest when they owed them to the president.

1999–2007: turbulent, but its own master

The 4th Senate went through three presidents in four years, Evan Enwerem, Chuba Okadigbo and Anyim Pius Anyim, largely over the presidency’s efforts to choose its leaders. In 2002, the House under Ghali Na’Abba served President Olusegun Obasanjo an impeachment notice. It was messy. But the chambers fought.

2006: the Senate that said no

On 16 May 2006, the Senate threw out the constitutional amendment that would have let Obasanjo stand for a third term. Senate President Ken Nnamani told the chamber it had decided “clearly and eloquently” to discontinue the bill.

It was not easy. Reuters reported that third-term backers wanted secret voting, a ban on television coverage and a simple-majority threshold. Nnamani insisted that only a rigorous application of the rules could resolve the crisis. Opponents alleged bribery and blackmail. Nnamani later wrote that promises of return tickets and large sums were offered, and that his own re-election was foreclosed because he was marked as the principal figure in ending the project. Obasanjo has repeatedly denied involvement in the plan.

One irony: the bill died by voice vote too. The method was the same as in the Rivers vote. The courage was not.

2007–2015: necessity, then independence

Under Senate President David Mark, the National Assembly faced a crisis the Constitution had not foreseen. President Umaru Yar’Adua left the country on 23 November 2009 and did not transmit power. On 9 February 2010, both chambers, led by Mark and Speaker Dimeji Bankole, passed resolutions invoking the “doctrine of necessity” and made Vice President Goodluck Jonathan Acting President. Mark argued that necessity required the Assembly to act in a situation the Constitution had not contemplated. Critics, including the Action Congress, called the resolution illegal and outside section 145. Whatever its legal footing, it was the legislature taking the initiative, not waiting for instructions.

The House went further in 2011. Defying both the PDP and President Jonathan, members joined the opposition to elect Aminu Tambuwal Speaker by 252 votes to 90 over the party’s anointed candidate, Mulikat Akande-Adeola. It was the first time the House chose its own Speaker against the ruling party’s arrangement. Mark later admitted he was privy to the rebellion.

That House checked the President on the issues that mattered. After fuel subsidy was removed on 1 January 2012, it sat in emergency session and set up an ad hoc probe. The committee established subsidy payments of ₦2.587 trillion, against an official figure of ₦1.3 trillion, and asked the NNPC, the PPPRA and marketers to refund over ₦1 trillion. The probe was later stained when businessman Femi Otedola alleged its chairman, Farouk Lawan, demanded money to keep a company out of the report. The House removed Lawan as chairman but kept its resolutions.

In November 2014, after Tambuwal defected to the opposition, police fired teargas into the National Assembly complex as lawmakers arrived to consider Jonathan’s request to extend emergency rule in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. The House declined the extension. Mark, from the President’s own party, shut the National Assembly and summoned the Inspector-General of Police.

There were few open battles in those eight years. But Jonathan was checked. The lesson matters for today: a legislature can work with a president of its own party and still say no, when its leaders owe their seats to their colleagues rather than to the Villa.

2015–2019: the most assertive Senate

Bukola Saraki became Senate President by aligning with PDP senators to defeat his own party’s preferred candidate. His leadership of the 8th Senate is widely adjudged the most assertive of the Fourth Republic.

The Senate twice rejected Ibrahim Magu as EFCC chairman, in 2016 and 2017. Ministerial nominations faced lengthy reviews and borrowing requests were scrutinised. It refused a $22.7 billion external loan request that the next Senate later approved.

It had its critics. Some of its investigations were perceived as retaliation against the President, and budget battles delayed the 2017 appropriation. Saraki’s own view is that an effective legislature must be able to assess and, when necessary, reject executive proposals.

2019–2023: “good for the nation”

The pendulum swung hard. Senate President Ahmad Lawan said the Senate would willingly approve whatever came from President Muhammadu Buhari. The Sun reported that the 9th Senate approved over $40 billion in loans in four years, including the $22.7 billion its predecessor had refused. It also approved the ₦22.7 trillion Ways and Means securitisation.

Senator Ali Ndume later said he had insisted on details of how the Ways and Means money was spent, but the Senate approved it anyway. In his valedictory speech, Senator Binos Yeroe of Adamawa South said he agreed that the 9th Senate was a rubber stamp, citing that approval.

The third-term test

In 2006, third term failed because more than a third of senators declared they would vote no, at personal cost. A constitutional amendment still needs two-thirds of each chamber and of the 36 state assemblies.

Today’s evidence is sobering. The President’s State Police Bill drew 311 votes in the House. Within six weeks of transmission, 25 state assemblies had approved it. The other 36 alteration bills stalled.

Let me state it plainly: had the third-term bill come before this National Assembly, it would have sailed through. The safeguard that stopped Obasanjo, a blocking third willing to say no at personal cost, is the one most visibly missing today. On this Assembly’s record, there is no sign of where that third would come from.

The charge sheet

The record of the 10th National Assembly shows a pattern: the executive asks, the legislature obliges, and questions are settled after the money has moved.

A budget that grew on request

President Bola Tinubu laid a ₦58.47 trillion 2026 Appropriation Bill before a joint sitting on 19 December 2025. The Guardian reported that it scaled through second reading without debate. By the time it passed, the National Assembly had raised it to ₦68.3 trillion, after the executive formally asked for more. In the same sitting, lawmakers approved a fresh $6 billion external loan.

The calendar was broken too. The Fiscal Responsibility Act requires the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework to reach the National Assembly at least four months before the financial year begins. The Guardian reported that this deadline was breached, and the budget was received anyway. To keep money flowing, lawmakers also repealed and re-enacted the 2024 and 2025 Appropriation Acts, stretching spending into 2026.

Ways and Means: breach first, ratify later

The CBN Act caps the central bank’s Ways and Means advances to the Federal Government at 5% of the previous year’s revenue. Successive governments blew through that cap. In May 2023, the 9th Assembly approved converting ₦22.7 trillion of these advances into a 40-year bond at 9%, with a three-year moratorium. Nairametrics reported that it also amended the CBN Act to raise the ceiling from 5% to 15%.

Then-Senate President Ahmad Lawan warned that the legislature would not condone future increases without its approval. Seven months later, the 10th Assembly approved the securitisation of another ₦7.3 trillion at President Tinubu’s request. BudgIT noted that the legislature had asked for details of how the funds were used, received no answer, and approved anyway.

Rivers: two-thirds by shouting

On 20 March 2025, both chambers endorsed the state of emergency in Rivers State by voice vote. Section 305(6)(b) demands two-thirds of all members: at least 73 senators and 240 representatives. Senate President Godswill Akpabio declared the approval unanimous. The House said 243 members had signed its register, but no individual vote was recorded. Senators Ireti Kingibe and Aminu Tambuwal objected that a two-thirds majority cannot be established by volume.

One bill out of 37

The constitution review began with 37 harmonised alteration bills. Only one has passed both chambers and gone to the states: the State Police Bill, which the President sent in. The Senate passed it on 24 June 2026 and the House on 23 July 2026. Proposals that would strengthen legislatures themselves, such as a constitutional deadline for presenting budgets and recognition of Assembly Service Commissions, have not moved.

Not a rubber stamp: a co-signatory

The rubber-stamp label misses something. BudgIT found that the National Assembly inserted 11,122 projects worth ₦6.93 trillion into the 2025 budget, about 12.5% of the ₦54.99 trillion signed. Of these, 238 projects above ₦5 billion each came to ₦2.29 trillion. The agriculture ministry’s capital budget swelled from ₦242.5 billion to ₦1.95 trillion.

BusinessDay, citing BudgIT, reported that insertions grew from ₦913.15 billion in 2021 to ₦6.9 trillion in 2025. BudgIT says letters to the Presidency, the Budget Office and the National Assembly drew no response. Lawmakers counter that the Constitution gives them the power to amend appropriations.

A legislature that waves through the executive’s spending while adding its own is not passive. It is a partner in the bargain.

Dissent has a price

The Senate suspended Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan for six months from 6 March 2025, despite an interim order from the Federal High Court. Justice Binta Nyako later called the suspension excessive and ordered her recall. In February 2026, the Court of Appeal upheld the Senate’s power to suspend her and set aside the contempt fine against her. Whatever the merits, every member watched what happens to a colleague who crosses the presiding officer.

The cash in the chamber

It is common knowledge in Abuja that legislation moves with cash. Bills, budgets and confirmations have long come with payouts to lawmakers. The tradition dates back to the Obasanjo years, and it has not stopped.

Where it started

In March 2005, President Obasanjo went on national television to say his Education Minister, Fabian Osuji, had raised ₦55 million ($410,000) to share among Senate President Adolphus Wabara and other lawmakers, to pass an inflated ministry budget. Osuji was sacked. Before the Senate Ethics Committee, he said the lawmakers had demanded what he called a “welfare package”, not a bribe. Wabara resigned in April 2005.

The EFCC’s interim report also named a vice-chancellor who allegedly provided ₦25 million for the passage of the 2004 budget. Fourteen years later, a court discharged and acquitted Wabara and two others of the charges. Wabara has since said he turned down ₦250 million to back the third-term bid in 2006.

It has not stopped

• The Petroleum Industry Bill, 2021. Peoples Gazette reported that five lawmakers corroborated that at least $10 million in cash was paid to members to speed the bill’s passage. One lawmaker admitted receiving $5,000. Lawmakers were also angered by claims that the Senate President and Speaker received $2 million each.
• “Bribe-for-bills”, 2025. Representative Ibrahim Usman Auyo (APC, Jigawa) said in a video that members pay between ₦1 million and ₦3 million to present motions, bills or petitions at plenary. The House spokesman called the claim baseless and deeply irresponsible. SERAP sued Senate President Akpabio and Speaker Tajudeen Abbas in November 2025 for failing to refer the allegation to the EFCC and ICPC.
• From inside the building. The Guardian reported that a senior National Assembly official, Ifeoma Ofili, accused lawmakers of entrenched bribery, manipulating public hearing reports and diverting staff entitlements.

The “token” on live television

The clearest glimpse came from the top, less than two months into the 10th Senate. On 7 August 2023, before the Senate rose for its annual recess, Senate President Akpabio told colleagues that, so they could enjoy their holidays, “a token has been sent to our various accounts by the Clerk”. He appeared unaware that proceedings were being broadcast live.

Amid an uproar, he withdrew the remark and said the leadership had instead sent prayers to senators’ mailboxes. National Assembly management then said the payment was ₦2 million per senator, part of each office’s running cost in the 2023 budget, not a holiday allowance. Senator Ali Ndume defended it as customary. SERAP announced it would sue.

Former senator Shehu Sani summed it up: such payments are usually made discreetly, and Akpabio had simply “pressed the alarm”. The slip came weeks after fuel subsidy removal, as millions of Nigerians struggled to eat.

One of the most expensive democracies in the world

The official pay is modest. The Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) says a senator’s salary and allowances total ₦1,063,860 a month. The real pay is not.

In 2018, Senator Shehu Sani disclosed that each senator also receives ₦13.5 million a month as “running cost”. The Senate replied that this was “nothing new”, as the figure sat in the Assembly’s budget lines. In 2024, Senator Kawu Sumaila said each senator earns at least ₦21 million a month once running costs are added. Leadership put members of the House at ₦16 million a month, and the Senate alone at a minimum of ₦2.2 billion monthly.

The RMAFC has said its pay law covers salary and allowances, not running costs, and that only the National Assembly Service Commission can explain them. Femi Falana SAN called the rise from ₦14 million to ₦21 million illegal and contemptuous of a court judgment. Obasanjo himself has called it immoral for federal lawmakers to determine their own pay.

Set that against a national minimum wage of ₦70,000. Senate President Akpabio has said lawmakers serve out of sacrifice, not for personal enrichment. Nigerians may judge that for themselves.

How Nigeria compares

Raw pay alone flatters Nigeria, because richer countries pay more. The fairer test is what a lawmaker takes home measured against what the average citizen produces: pay divided by GDP per head. On that measure, a Nigerian senator costs his country about 150 times the average citizen’s output. In the United States, Britain and Canada, the figure is between two and three times.

In dollars, a Nigerian senator’s total take is larger than a US congressman’s $174,000, in a country whose output per head is about one seventy-third of America’s. Even on the official RMAFC figure alone, a senator earns nearly eight times the average Nigerian’s output, more than any of the Western legislators in the table.

The comparison is not entirely like for like, and it is fair to say so. Lawmakers in the US, UK and Canada also have large office and staff budgets. The difference is how they are paid: in Britain, IPSA reimburses costs against receipts and pays staff directly; in Nigeria, “running costs” are paid into the senator’s hands monthly, and, as the RMAFC itself says, only the National Assembly Service Commission can explain them. Italy’s figure with allowances is shown for the same reason: its diaria and mandate payments are flat-rate sums, as Nigeria’s running costs are.

How we calculated: pay converted at early-November 2026 rates (₦1,346.79, £1 = $1.342, $1 = C$1.405, €1 = $1.117, $1 = R16.6). GDP per head is the IMF’s 2025 estimate; Nigeria’s reflects the 2025 rebasing. Sources: US, Congressional Research Service; UK, IPSA; Canada, HRD/Daily Hive; Italy, Quotidiano Nazionale; South Africa, BusinessTech; Nigeria, Nairametrics, AllAfrica, Leadership; GDP per head, Worldometers/IMF, TheGlobalEconomy, Visual Capitalist/IMF, MeasuredWorld/IMF; exchange rates, CBN via WithinNigeria, Banque de France, RTTNews.

Why it matters to the balance of power

A legislator paid by the executive’s goodwill, and paid again to pass its bills, cannot be expected to check it. The cash does not only corrupt individuals. It is the mechanism by which the rubber stamp is inked.

• Pay set by law, not by lawmakers. All remuneration, including running costs, fixed only by the RMAFC and published by name and amount.
• Running costs as reimbursements. Paid against receipts, audited, and published, not handed over as monthly cash.
• Investigate, don’t dismiss. Refer the Auyo allegation and the PIB claims to the EFCC and ICPC, and protect whistleblowers who speak up from inside.
• Consider a leaner legislature. Proposals such as a part-time legislature paid sitting allowances deserve a hearing.

The bill to the economy

An unchecked executive and a compliant legislature are not just a constitutional problem. Nigerians pay for them in debt, inflation, interest rates and roads that are never built.

Debt that doubled

Nigeria’s public debt stood at ₦87.38 trillion in June 2023. By June 2026 it had reached ₦166.79 trillion, about 91% higher. Part of that rise is accounting, not new borrowing: naira devaluation inflated the value of foreign debt, and the securitised Ways and Means balance was moved onto the books. But every loan and every securitisation in that stock passed through the National Assembly.

The cost of carrying it is the real burden. BudgIT notes that annual debt service rose from about ₦3.0 trillion in 2021 to ₦12.36 trillion in 2024, with ₦15.91 trillion proposed for 2026. The Debt Management Office projects debt service at 51% of federal revenue in 2026, above its own 50% threshold, rising to 71.7% by 2030. More than half of what government earns goes to creditors before a single classroom is built.

Inflation by legislative approval

Ways and Means was the costliest rubber stamp of all. In 2024, Finance Minister Wale Edun told senators that eight years of printing money not matched by productivity was the main cause of the inflation Nigerians are living with. The legislature that should have stopped the overdraft instead ratified it, twice.

The cure was costly too. To fight inflation, the CBN more than doubled its benchmark rate, from 11.5% in early 2022 to a peak of 27.5% in 2025. BudgIT says heavy domestic borrowing has raised interest rates and crowded out credit to private business. Every manufacturer and trader paying 30% for a loan is paying part of that bill.

Borrowing without building

The legislature approves loans and enlarged budgets, but rarely checks what they buy. In the first nine months of 2025, the Federal Government borrowed ₦11.89 trillion, ₦1.54 trillion more than projected, yet left about 82% of its capital budget unspent. President Tinubu told the National Assembly that only about 17% of the 2025 capital budget had been released by the third quarter.

The Health Minister told lawmakers his ministry received ₦36 million of a ₦218 billion capital allocation for 2025. The Interior Minister said his ministry received no capital releases in 2024 or 2025. In the end, ministries were told to roll 70% of their 2025 capital budgets into 2026. Economist Dele Oye summed it up: Nigeria is accumulating debt without corresponding asset creation.

This is the price of a legislature that passes budgets it knows cannot be funded, then adds ₦9.8 trillion on request.

Projects paid for, never delivered

The insertions carry their own cost. BudgIT’s Tracka found in its 2024/2025 report that 471 federal projects were not executed at all despite ₦7.60 billion paid, and 99 were abandoned after ₦8 billion was disbursed. Another 92 were classed as fraudulently delivered. The ICPC reported recovering ₦5.6 billion from fraudulent constituency projects linked to the 2019 to 2021 budgets.

Who pays

The bill does not land in Abuja. It lands on the trader in Oshodi paying more for rice, the manufacturer in Ikeja who cannot afford credit, the patient in a hospital whose capital budget was never released, and the child in a classroom that exists only on a contractor’s invoice. That is the real cost of a legislature that stopped saying no.

The states: where the check is weakest

If the National Assembly bends, many state assemblies barely stand. About 17 state Houses of Assembly passed their 2026 budgets without changing a single figure their governors sent. The Guardian named Edo, Ekiti and Enugu among those that returned appropriation bills exactly as transmitted.

Thirteen others added more than ₦1 trillion between them. Lagos led, with the House adding about ₦207.51 billion to Governor Babajide Sanwo-Olu’s ₦4.237 trillion proposal, taking it to ₦4.44 trillion. Adding money is not the same as scrutinising it.

Financial independence remains largely a promise. Section 121(3) says assembly funds go directly to the assemblies. Yet the Conference of Speakers has had to call on governors to “immediately and fully comply”. In Edo, Governor Monday Okpebholo signed amendments in 2026 to the laws on the Assembly’s and judiciary’s financial autonomy, saying they strengthen transparency and due process.

Lagos: the vote that was not cast in the chamber

On 13 January 2025, Lagos lawmakers removed Speaker Mudashiru Obasa by more than a two-thirds majority, over allegations of high-handedness and corruption. The Lagos State Anti-Corruption Coalition had alleged that the Assembly spent ₦17 billion on a gate under his leadership. Mojisola Meranda became the first woman to lead the House.

Forty-nine days later, Ms Meranda resigned and Mr Obasa was back. Premium Times reported that the Federal Government facilitated his return. Punch reported that President Tinubu backed Mr Obasa staying on, despite a party panel led by Chief Bisi Akande recommending that he step down after reinstatement. In April 2025, the Lagos High Court nullified the removal on procedural grounds.

A note on terms: the lawmakers, and most of the Nigerian media, called this an “impeachment”. It was not. Under the Constitution, only the President, governors and their deputies are impeached (sections 143 and 188). A Speaker is removed by a resolution of at least two-thirds of the members of the House (section 92(2)(c) for state assemblies; section 50(2)(c) for the National Assembly). “Removal” is the correct term, and we use it here.

The procedure may have been flawed. But the outcome was settled by party elders and Abuja, not by the 40 members Lagosians elected.

The fourth estate: watchdog or lapdog?

No account of the balance of power is complete without the press. Section 22 of the Constitution charges the media with upholding the responsibility and accountability of government to the people. When the legislature fails to check the executive, the press is often the last check left.

When the press held the line

It has done so before. Ken Nnamani has said that, but for the media’s watchdog role, the third-term amendment would have sailed through. The same press that helped end military rule helped stop tenure elongation.

What it faces now

Reporters Without Borders ranks Nigeria 112th of 180 countries in its 2026 index, up from 122nd, but still in the “difficult” category. RSF says journalists are regularly monitored, attacked and arbitrarily arrested, and that crimes against them go unpunished.

• The Cybercrimes Act. In 2022, the ECOWAS Court declared section 24 of the 2015 Act arbitrary, vague and repressive, and ordered its repeal. The 2024 amendment rewrote it but still criminalises “cyberstalking”. CPJ counts at least 25 journalists prosecuted under the Act before the amendment, and more since.
• Reporting on power. Stanley Ugagbe of Secrets Reporters was arrested at his Abuja home on 1 July 2026, after an investigative report on a CBN deputy governor, and charged with conspiracy and cyberstalking. A Federal High Court ordered his remand in Kuje.
• This week: Daniel Ojukwu. On 10 November 2026, the FIJ reporter was arraigned before Justice Joyce Abdulmalik of the Federal High Court, Abuja, on 12 counts of cyberstalking and criminal defamation. He pleaded not guilty and was remanded in Kuje until 1 December, when his bail application will be heard. The charges, brought by the police, arise from FIJ investigations published in 2023 and 2024 into spending by the Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on the SDGs, headed by Adejoke Orelope-Adefulire, who served President Buhari in the role and was reappointed by President Tinubu in September 2023. FIJ founder Fisayo Soyombo is the second defendant, and has said he will appear in court on 1 December. Ojukwu was first detained for 10 days in May 2024 over reporting on the same official. The NUJ, SERAP and the Wole Soyinka Centre have demanded his release.
• The broadcast regulator. On 17 April 2026, the National Broadcasting Commission warned that any presenter who expresses personal opinion as fact, bullies a guest or denies opposing views a fair hearing commits a Class B breach. The Nigerian Guild of Editors called the stance “dangerous and injurious to journalism”. Media Rights Agenda argued that a ban on opinion should apply only to news bulletins, not to analysis and commentary.

The enemy within

Not every threat comes from outside the newsroom. RSF’s West Africa bureau director, Sadibou Marong, has spoken of a proliferation of outlets owned by politicians with no passion for the profession, and of godfatherism in the media as in politics. Many of the country’s most influential newspapers and stations are owned by serving or aspiring politicians. The President himself owns The Nation newspaper and TVC.

We in the press must own our part. A newsroom that takes the brown envelope cannot credibly report on the legislator’s “token”. A paper owned by a candidate cannot be trusted to audit his party’s lawmakers. Paid coverage dressed up as news is the press’s own rubber stamp.

What the press can do in the next 64 days

• Publish every incumbent’s attendance, sponsored bills and recorded votes, constituency by constituency.
• Put the five questions to every legislative candidate, and publish who answered and who declined.
• Label sponsored content plainly, and refuse paid coverage presented as news.
• Pool resources across outlets to track the next National Assembly and state assemblies from day one.

And from government: repeal the cyberstalking provisions, as the ECOWAS Court ordered, and confine the NBC’s limits on opinion to news bulletins.

The defence

The leadership rejects the label. Opening the 2026 National Assembly Open Week in July, Senate President Akpabio argued that institutional harmony is essential to national stability, and that the legislature had worked constructively with President Tinubu.

Senate Leader Opeyemi Bamidele went further. If the Assembly were a rubber stamp, he said, executive bills would pass within a week or two of being laid. He pointed to the slow passage of budgets as proof of scrutiny.

There is something to this. A legislature dominated by the president’s party will agree with him often, as happens elsewhere. Cooperation is not a crime. But the test is not whether a legislature agrees. It is whether it can say no, and whether citizens can see who said what. On the Rivers emergency, on Ways and Means and on a budget enlarged by ₦9.8 trillion at the executive’s request, the answer to both was no.

Why it happens

Legislators are not weak because they lack powers. They are weak because their careers do not depend on using them.

• The ticket comes from the executive. Presidents and governors control party structures, and with them the primaries. A lawmaker who crosses the chief executive risks the next nomination.
• The money comes from the executive. State assemblies still wait on governors for releases. Constituency projects, inserted or not, are funded only when the executive chooses to release cash.
• The votes are invisible. A voice vote leaves no record of who said aye. Without a record, there is nothing for voters to punish or reward.
• The opposition has thinned. A run of defections by governors and lawmakers to the ruling party since 2025 has left fewer members with any reason to object.
• Voters vote the logo. Few constituents know how their representative voted, or whether they attended. The legislative ballot is cast on party lines, so performance is never priced in.

What to do

Restoring the balance needs two things: voters who price legislative performance, and rules that make performance visible. Neither needs a new constitution.

Before the polls: what voters can do

1. Ask every legislative candidate five questions. Will you demand recorded votes on budgets, loans and emergencies? Will you publish your constituency projects and their status? Will you publish your attendance and your votes? Will you insist on direct funding of your assembly under section 121(3)? Will you refuse to ratify Ways and Means beyond the legal limit?
2. Check the incumbent’s record. Attendance, bills sponsored and recorded votes are tracked by groups such as PLAC and OrderPaper. Constituency project lists are tracked by BudgIT’s Tracka.
3. Treat the legislative ballot as its own decision. Splitting your vote is legal. A president or governor facing an assembly not wholly beholden to him is the cheapest check Nigerians can buy.
4. Make the pledge public. Civil society and the media can ask candidates of all parties to sign a short legislative independence pledge, and publish who signed and who declined.

After the polls: the first 100 days of the next legislatures

1. Record every vote that matters. Amend standing orders so every money bill, loan request, emergency proclamation and constitutional vote is decided by recorded electronic vote, published by name within 24 hours. No constitutional amendment is required.
2. Open the legislature’s own books. Publish the National Assembly and state assembly budgets line by line, including members’ allowances.
3. Fix the budget calendar. Pass the pending proposal requiring budgets to be laid at least 60 days before the year ends. Enforce the Fiscal Responsibility Act’s MTEF deadline by refusing late submissions.
4. Close the Ways and Means tap. Restore a hard statutory cap, require quarterly CBN disclosure of outstanding advances, and end retrospective securitisation. In 2024, the National Assembly itself proposed up to 21 years’ imprisonment for breaching the CBN Act. Pass it.
5. Put insertions in daylight. Any project added by the legislature should carry a costing, location and executing agency, and be published before passage. BudgIT has proposed a Fiscal Compliance Review Committee to assess allocations quarterly.
6. Give section 121(3) teeth. Pay assembly funds directly from source, so that a governor who withholds them has nothing to withhold.
7. Act on audit reports. Set a fixed period within which Public Accounts Committees must consider the Auditor-General’s reports, and publish their findings.
8. Loosen the party’s grip. Transparent primaries, and a fresh hearing for ideas such as independent candidacy, would let a legislator survive disagreeing with a governor.

The ballot below the ballot

The presidency and the governorships will dominate the next 64 days. But a president checked by a working National Assembly, and a governor checked by a working House, is a safer bet than any candidate’s promises. Sanity in our democracy will not be restored by electing better chief executives alone. It will be restored when the people we send to check them believe their careers depend on doing so.

That belief begins on 16 January and 6 February.