By Nkanu Egbe
Examining Nigeria’s unfinished response to an insurgency crisis — what the record shows, what the government still hasn’t answered, and what it owes the people burying their dead.
On July 16, 2026, gunmen attacked a community in Oturkpo, Benue State — not an isolated hamlet but, as journalist and activist Stephen Kefas said at the Lagos roundtable, one “a stone’s throw” from the Federal University of Health Sciences. Sixteen people were killed. Thirteen days later, an attack in Southern Kaduna left 30 dead. These were among the reports cited at that roundtable, which brought together testimony from Southern Kaduna, Benue, and Plateau — testimony about mass graves, broken families, and villages people can no longer safely farm. What follows examines those reports, and the broader pattern they describe, alongside independent reporting — because the people living through this crisis have waited long enough for their government to match its response to the scale of what is happening to them.
Timeline: two decades, one accelerating pattern
A conflict that outgrew its old name
For years the standard shorthand was “farmer-herder clash” — a phrase describing real material roots: population growth, shrinking grazing corridors, rainfall patterns pushing herding communities south, and a proliferation of small arms that turned disputes once settled by mediation into ones that end in mass graves. That framing hasn’t disappeared, but it has come under sustained, and on the evidence increasingly justified, pressure from witnesses who describe something more organised: repeated targeting of the same communities, attackers who camp openly enough that farmers reportedly pay them tribute to stay alive, and a pattern of local herders quietly leaving communities in the days before an attack.
“If it were to be a clash, who are the majorities? … In a clash, there should be some level of casualties on both sides.”Stephen Kefas, journalist & activist, Southern Kaduna
Human Rights Watch’s most recent reporting on Benue still describes the violence as “intercommunal,” without adopting the “genocide” language MBC and other advocacy groups use; commentary in Al Jazeera and New Internationalist has pushed back specifically on “Christian genocide” as too narrow an account. That argument over the right label will keep running — it should not be allowed to delay the response owed to the people already living its consequences.
It is also not a new argument. SBM Intelligence’s October 2015 report “Terror in the Food Basket,” based on fieldwork in Benue, Nasarawa, and Plateau, documented the same systematic pattern more than a decade ago — killings that turned “systematic and methodical” from late 2012, communities that had gone years without a harvest, and food-price shocks in markets as far away as Lagos. MBC says the report drew on input from one of its own founding members. Whatever the provenance, the pattern it documented in 2015 is, point for point, the one still being described in 2026.
A crisis the state still can’t count
The toll of a single attack — Yelwata, Benue State, June 2025 — depends entirely on who is asked. Whichever figure is closest to correct, even the government’s own lowest count describes dozens killed in one night, in a community many residents had already fled to once.
Yelwata death toll, by source
June 2025 attack, Benue State — figures as reported, not reconciled
| Source | Figure | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Benue State government | 59 | Official confirmed count |
| Media reports / victim lists | 100+ | Community-compiled names |
| Stephen Kefas, MBC roundtable | 278 | Testimony, 13 Aug 2026 |
Nine suspects were arraigned over the attack in February 2026 and pleaded not guilty — set against Kefas’s description of an assault by roughly 200 armed men.
How many are displaced? Depends who’s counting.
Figures cover different scopes and dates — not directly comparable, shown together to illustrate the gap
| Source | Figure | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| UNHCR / US congressional visit (cited at roundtable) | 600,000 | Middle Belt |
| USCIRF, May 2026 | 1,300,000 | Middle Belt |
| Vanguard News, Mar 2026 | 3,726,000 | Nationwide, all causes |
No Nigerian government agency has published a single, current, credible count of the Middle Belt’s dead or displaced. For a state that counts votes to the last ballot, that absence is itself part of the story.
Rehabilitating fighters while victims wait
One of the sharpest, most repeated demands raised at the roundtable — halt the government’s rehabilitation programme for former fighters — lands on a controversy already live and well documented independent of this event.
“No credible public data exists on recidivism or post-reintegration outcomes.”Security analyst, on Operation Safe Corridor, Jul 2026
Former fighters
- Named, funded programme: Operation Safe Corridor, running since 2016
- 744 formally rehabilitated in a July 2026 ceremony
- Psychological evaluation, ideological reorientation, vocational training
- Public recidivism data
Victims & displaced families
- Named, funded resettlement programme
- Psychosocial trauma support
- Dedicated healthcare provision
- Reparations for loss of homes, land, family
“A former fighter can walk into a state-funded reintegration programme with vocational training and a second chance. A child orphaned in Southern Kaduna cannot walk into anything comparable.”
Land, minerals, and a fight Nigeria has had before
In 2019, the Buhari administration tried to establish herder settlements nationwide under a programme called RUGA. It was suspended within weeks after fierce opposition from southern and Middle Belt governors and civil society groups, who called it a land grab. Seven years later, a new federal grazing and ranching reserve plan for Benue State has drawn a near-identical response: the Catholic Diocesan Priests’ Association in Makurdi issued a statement titled “Our Land Is Not for Sale,” and Benue’s opposition PDP says the state government was excluded from the decision.
Meanwhile, the one policy experiment in the region with reported results runs in the opposite direction: Taraba State’s June 2026 suspension of all mining licences, justified by a documented link between illegal mining and the funding and land-clearing logic behind local violence.
Nigeria’s security budget, 2016 vs. 2026
Naira, as cited at the roundtable
| Year | Security budget |
|---|---|
| 2016 | ₦1.1 trillion |
| 2026 | ₦5.4 trillion |
A near five-fold increase in a decade, over which the region’s attacks, displacement, and impunity gap have all deepened rather than closed.
Operations exist; the killing hasn’t stopped
The Middle Belt has not been entirely without a military response. The Army has run Operation Whirl Stroke in Benue since 2018 and a long-running, rebranded Operation Safe Haven in Plateau; both regularly announce arrests, weapons recoveries, and rescued kidnap victims. But announcements are not outcomes: Human Rights Watch’s own tally of 2025 Plateau attacks alone — 56 killed in April, 42 in May, dozens more in June — records no confirmed arrests for the April killings. Nor is there a public record of the kind of coordinated air campaign the Nigerian Air Force routinely reports against bandit camps in Zamfara, Katsina, and Kano.
“Why are there more military operations in the Northwest and Northeast than in the Middle Belt, while village after village is taken over, people are killed, and women are raped?”Stephen Kefas, MBC roundtable, 13 Aug 2026
Arms, seizures, and the missing paper trail
Nigeria Customs does seize and publicise significant arms shipments — a ₦1.5 billion cache from Turkey, hundreds of rifles at Tin Can Island Port as recently as this month — and periodically hands recovered weapons to the National Centre for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons for destruction. But in the public record examined for this piece, no seizure has yet led to the prosecution of an importer, financier, or intended recipient. Interception without a named buyer is not accountability.
What this demands of government
The reports cited at MBC’s roundtable are, point for point, a mix of the independently well documented — mass-casualty attacks, chronic non-prosecution, a live and contested rehabilitation programme, a revived and contested land policy — and details that remain to be independently verified. That mix is not a reason for doubt. It is what happens when a state fails, for a decade, to build the basic infrastructure that would let its own citizens know what has happened to them.
Why does the state still not have a credible, current count of its own dead and displaced?
Why is there a funded reintegration programme for fighters and none for their victims?
Why hasn’t Taraba’s mining-licence suspension been piloted elsewhere in the region?
Why is a new grazing-reserve plan proceeding in Benue without the state government’s involvement?
Why has no arms seizure produced a named importer or financier in open court?
Why hasn’t the airpower used against bandits in the Northwest been extended to the Middle Belt?
None of these require settling the argument over what to call this violence. They are answerable now, by agencies that already hold the relevant files. It requires only that the government treat the people burying their dead in Oturkpo, Southern Kaduna, and Plateau as citizens whose government owes them answers — and start giving them.
In their own words
“Enough of ‘unknown gunmen.’ They are not unknown — survivors are saying who attacked them.”
“Insecurity has become the biggest gold mine in Nigeria, the new ‘oil well.'”
“Justice here cannot just look at the end point — it has to look at where the rain began to beat us.”
“If you have a three-year-old of your own resting on your chest in peace at home, think about the three-year-old in the IDP camp.”

